

on 15 July 1960


Ladies and gentlemen, for posterity I always enjoy these opportunities of meeting with the incoming class. I'm generally on time. This morning we've been having a meeting of the United States Intelligence Board, and we didn't get out until 20 minutes of two trying to agree just how many missiles the Russians had. If I thought we'd come out with the right answer, I think I'd have stayed longer even if I'd kept you waiting

I am convinced that the success of this Agency depends probably more on the building up year by year of new classes and groups of career men and women than on any other one thing. I don't know of any work where training is more essential, where the devotion to a career is more essential, and where consanguinity of effort is more essential. Therefore it has been my practice in the past, and I hope it will be the practice of many successors, to build the Agency out of and through the JOIs.

As a relatively new Agency, we're now approximately 13 years old; but if one takes our predecessor agency the OSS, which goes back to 1942, we then had to start on a somewhat different basis. This country

had never before trained a career elite in the field of intelligence on any coherent, long-range basis. Some of this kind of work was done in the military services, but not enough. But since we have started these JOI courses, we have been able to recruit men and women who are a pride to the Agency and will be its backbone in the future. Intelligence work is a job that is a particular call, I think, to the vigor of youth. I keep out of politics, but I'm willing to make at least one prediction that seems likely to happen, namely that our next President will be in his forties. A strong wind blows in Chicago, something almost more than a draft.

25X6A And you're coming into the Agency at a vastly exciting time. There are great areas of the world that in the past were merely blots on a geographical atlas. Many of them practically unknown, or great parts of them unknown, to us are where today vital issues are being fought out between East and West and between Communism and the Free World. At lunch,



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I also have a feeling that it is going to be in this decade that we are going to decide some of the crucial issues as between Communism and the Free World, decide the struggles on that issue engaged in in Cuba at the present time as well as in the Congo, and in great parts of South East Asia and Africa, and in this hemisphere. It is in this decade, too, that I believe we will have to show whether we can answer the Communist techniques of subversion, of economic penetration, of appeal to all those elements that tear down rather than build up in the hope that the Communists can thereby gain a foothold. A blueprint of political seduction is really what we face. And this Agency under its charter, as given it by the National Security Council, has not only the duties, as you know, of analyzing these problems and providing intelligence on them; but it also has a duty to take various types of measures in the action field to meet the Communist menace. In many of these areas of which I speak, the greater share of the work will have to be done by our Agency. The situation is not adapted to the ordinary type of diplomatic procedures; people of the areas don't know what diplomacy is. Conditions are too primitive. And maybe I shall shock some of you when I say that from our point of view today a post like [REDACTED] may well be more important than one like [REDACTED]. It is

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in places like [REDACTED] where issues are being determined 25X1A6A
and where we can be of particular help in seeing that the solution is the
right one.

Last night I was thinking of the talk with you today. I got to looking
back over my own case-officer experience, which, as Mat says, goes back a
good many years, from World War I days when I had the job from Bern of
penetrating Austria and the Balkans. Austria was then a part of the
Central Powers with which we were at war. I was trying to help detach
these countries from Germany. That's quite a large office for a very
young case officer, but I and others made some progress in doing the job.
I was thinking back also over what were the elements of a good case officer,
or some of them. Considering the errors and mistakes that I then made, if
I were doing it over again what would I more or less concentrate on?

I've often told this story. Maybe some of you have heard it. It's
not new. It's about the mistake I made in 1917 when I was in Switzerland
starting as a case officer in the early days. I was invited one day to
go down from Bern to Luzanne or Vevey, I forget which, to meet a strange,
long-bearded man who had a new theory. His name as given to me at that
time didn't mean anything at all; therefore I said since I had a game of
tennis I'd like to play that day, I thought I'd see him later. Well, the
man turned out to be none other than Lenin; and there wasn't any later
time because 10 days after this date the Germans smuggled him on a train
and sent him to Finland. Several months later in the fall they sent him back,
and he took part in the October Revolution. Well, since then I've seen a
lot of queer people; but I'd rather take a chance on seeing one or two
queer ones than to miss another Lenin.

Here I feel are some of the elements of the good case officer. I jotted them down as I thought of them last night, and I dictated them this morning. Then I didn't even have a chance to read my notes before I came here.

I put down first the ability to judge the men and the women with whom you will be working. I am speaking here very largely of those agents that you may recruit or others on whom you may rely and of their capacity and their motivation to carry out the task you may entrust to them. Sound judgment of human nature, of people, is essential.


Second, the ability as far as possible to judge whether you are being told the truth or being lied to; developing this skill is not easy. Here, as I've learned, because I've fallen down several times on this particular point, you can only hope for a fairly good batting average and not for perfection; however, it is important to be right a good deal more than half the time. You're allowed a few errors, a few slips. We all have them, but it's important to keep the batting average pretty high. Now you'll ask me how you can tell. I don't know. The skill is partly instinct; it partly comes from ability to judge a character. If the fellow being judged has good character, he may make a lot of mistakes; but he won't deliberately lie to you.

The next point I have here is to try to seek out and separate the essentials of the task from the non-essentials. I have to read a great pile of telegrams every day. I generally feel that about half of them might as well not have been sent. Still I find it very difficult to decrease the numbers. All of the half that needed sending should have been about half

as long. We are getting more and more millions of words -- I don't know whether it's a week, a day, a year but anyway we're getting a tremendous number of telegrams every day. The lesson should be well learned that if you can put your message on one page, it's going to be read by a lot more people than if you put it on 10 pages.

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We ourselves have got to find some way in our work to try to cut down from the non-essential to the essential.

Here is another point that I've partly covered: learn how to express your ideas clearly, briefly, and interestingly. A message that is read and interests the reader is far more likely to bring action and results than a dull thesis. I'm trying to improve the general order of writing in the Agency. When I get an unusually badly written piece I send it back; when I get something that is well written, I try to give special acclaim to the writer. We're not writing well enough in the Agency. We fall down a great deal in expressing ourselves; we don't give enough attention to writing clearly and concisely. This is something the British have been

very good at. They've learned how to write lucidly. They've learned in their civil service and in their foreign service and otherwise. Here I think that we ought to see how best we can improve ourselves. [“Do you work on that? Do you really? I hope you will because I feel that is very important,” Mr. Dulles said to Mr. Baird.]

And now another thing here that is difficult and that I hadn't always too well done myself -- to learn to work with your superiors and your equals, even when the going is hard. The tougher the post, the greater the strain, the more the friction, the more important working with others is. I don't think I'm a very good one to talk on this subject because at my first diplomatic post I had a terrible falling out with my Ambassador. Fortunately since the falling out was at the end of his days in the post, the only thing I lost -- well, I lost \$25,000 because when he died he left everybody at the post but me that amount in his will! So I tell you, that disagreement was expensive. My position in the half-hour when he and I really broke, I think, was wholly justified. I do to this day, but still it didn't pay. So I've learned that lesson. I probably don't practice what I learned much now. I get pretty crochety at times, I think.

The next need, and this goes back a little to my Lenin story, is to be everlastingly inquisitive in developing new methods and new techniques, and in finding new solutions to problems. Ingenuity is the spark of our work here. Almost every day I try to think up something new that we ought to be doing. I have morning meetings three times a week with the senior staff, and I try to come in with some new idea that is going to cause somebody a lot of work. The ideas don't all pan out, but every once

in a while they do. Anyway, I think it's a good idea to have them.

And my next point is to give attention to details without becoming a slave to them. In our work, clues to solving vastly important problems may seem to be trivial details and sometimes unimportant. To spot them is very difficult. As I say, don't become a slave to detail; but don't neglect detail. I recall our looking for clues after the Chinese intervention in the war in Korea, when the Chinese Communists came across the Yalu river and surprised our forces. Afterwards we held a big post-mortem and tried to see whether there had been any indices of such Chinese action which, if we had noted them beforehand, might have alerted us. We didn't find many, but we did find some. I remember that one of them that we should have taken into account, or that should have been taken into account. (this was just before I took over so that I have an alibi) was the fact that Red China had acquired unusually large amounts of antibiotics just before entering the war.

Well, the points I have made, and I could add to the list a great many more, give you some of my ideas. I have indicated some of the qualities that we ought to try to develop in ourselves as we do our work in the Agency whether we are just starting at the threshold, or whether we've been on the job for a long number of years. As I say, this list could be expanded almost indefinitely; and I'll probably add points to it before I finish.

While today we are in the machine age, machines should be our servants but not our masters. Machines, useful as they are, may help to give us the facts; but they cannot give us solutions. During these last few weeks, in fact since May Day, we've been having some machine problems, not

insoluble. That day saw an accident to one of our operations. But looking back don't forget that the U-2 operation was one of the most productive and the most daring intelligence operations ever mounted. It went on for about five years -- four years. The project itself had been going five years, but it was in operation about four. The breakdown does not mean that we here are going to lose initiative in developing in any way other enterprising and even dangerous operations because such initiative is the life blood of our success. Some of our activities may have to be of somewhat different nature. We may not be able always to use the same instruments in the same manner, but we must find ways to be even more ingenious.

I was very much interested in the fact that after the U-2 situation became public property, there was a tremendous rise in applications for positions with the Agency. The applications seemed to be very serious ones, a great many of them. They just flooded in. Double, three times, four times as many as ever before. One of them may have been intended a little humorously. The applicant wrote me a letter; there are only four words in it and then the signature, a real signature. And the application went as follows, "Have Brownie will fly." You may have seen that in the paper. I gave it out to the press. I thought it was rather cute.

As General Cabell has told you, we are in an era of sharp competition; but I don't believe that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are a bit smarter than Americans are. In fact, I don't believe they're really inherently so smart. Certainly they don't have as good a cause as we have.

Maybe they are working harder than Americans in general. If that's the case, then I'm not referring just to this Agency because I think we in the Agency are working pretty hard. But the Soviets make their mistakes. In fact, I don't think any great leader has made more mistakes, or alienated more people in more different places in the world than has Mr. Khrushchev during the last six weeks -- from Paris to Cuba and the Congo. In each instance, he overplayed his hand. In Paris he helped to bring the Atlantic Alliance together; in Cuba he has helped pull together the Latin American States in more unity, not perfect unity, but certainly closer to the United States; in the Congo by his action he has shocked large segments of European opinion. So the Soviets give us opportunities, too. But through all this we see the true image of the Communist threat, shorn of some of the sanctity the Communists tried to throw around it through their program of co-existence. Here is the major target for our operations and for our intelligence work.

I've talked longer than I intended to. I've just told Mat that I would like to come down [REDACTED] some time maybe in September if I'm not abroad, and spend an evening reminiscing with you. I'd like to have a chance to talk about some of my own intelligence experience, for what use it may be to you. I've had a great deal of luck from time to time, and I'd like to pass on such luck to you.


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I wish you would ask questions. Let me tell you a story. About three weeks ago I went over to Paris to SHAPE. I was there to join with a British and a French colleague in giving a briefing. We were given a whole morning. We spent it briefing all the brass in the Western world, all our Joint


Chiefs of Staff, all the British Joint Chiefs, all the French, all of NATO, all of the NATO military and all of their Ambassadors. And the first day the Secretary General of NATO made a magnificent speech in which he analyzed, in an interesting way, the new Soviet program since the Twentieth and Twenty-first Party Congress. I was sitting next to the presiding officer down below. When the Secretary General got through with his learned address, very well delivered, for he's a brilliant orator, questions were asked for. There wasn't a question out of the whole crowd. The Britisher getting hold of me and shoving my arm, said, "Get up and ask a question." Now I was kind of the last one there. I was kind of an interloper. But I got up and asked a question, I don't know what it was. Then the dam broke, and everything was all right.

But when we had our intelligence briefing, we had two hours of questions and there wasn't any delay in asking them. We could have stayed there all day. Questions were popping up all over. They wanted to know all about the U-2 among other things. Why had we stopped the U-2? Wasn't it as good as we'd said it was? All kinds of questions.

And so you go ahead. Are there any questions? Who wants to be the British General? Oh good, here's a question.



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Mr. Dulles - Thank you very, very much.

Q - This is tentative, sir, but in the U-2 incident the United States Government departed from traditional intelligence activities in admitting responsibility for the U-2. Mr. Walter Lippman went so far as to say that we were no longer playing the game according to the rules. I wonder if you could outline why the U.S. Government made this change.

A - Well, I don't think that Walter Lippman's statement is quite correct. And if there is any rule book for our work, I don't know where it exists. We're also in a new age where most of the old rules are out of date. It's very interesting just as this admission of responsibility took place, although the new situation didn't develop until a little later, we had the situation with regard to -- what's the name of the man who was caught in the Argentine and taken back to Israel? Eichman - The Eichman case involved very much the same type of technical violation of the territory of another power. The violation has been clearly pinned on where it belongs. There's been

no effort made, or maybe it hasn't been proclaimed, to deny government responsibility for that violation. And so you find the rules changing. The President had two alternatives in the U-2 case. Either he could admit that he didn't know what was going on in the Government and that this kind of thing could happen without being clear at the highest level, or he could assume responsibility. I think he did exactly what was right. I don't think under the circumstances and over the long run he could ever have maintained the position of denial. There were hundreds of people who knew. It doesn't often happen that with so many in the know, this thing was kept within the group perfectly for four years. There were a hundred who knew more than the President. Under these conditions denial was not easy. The President doesn't lie very well anyway; he doesn't like to lie. And furthermore, as I said, even if he had wanted to and thought lying was technically the right thing to do, he was caught in the dilemma of saying, "I don't know what's going on in the Government. Strange things can happen. People can run off and fly over Russia, and I don't know anything about it." That would have been, to my mind, a far more impossible position to take than to violate the traditional disavowing rules. All ordinary agent running you can disavow perfectly easy. A U-2 operation was not an ordinary agent-running effort.

Q - How do you feel personally about this swapping espionage agents, say Abel for Powers? Do you think such swapping would be successful?

A - I don't quite understand. Do you mean this Khrushchev proposal to me?

Q - No. I'm just curious about your own feeling about the question of swapping the agent.

A - Oh, swapping Abel for Powers - I didn't catch the name Abel. I see. I don't think it's practical. I don't think it's practical, you see, because the Russians never have admitted that Abel belonged to them. They would never do anything about supplying him with counsel. They never would communicate with him. They never gave him any aid or help whatever, and I doubt whether the Russians would avow him. It was absolutely proved what he was. But this was the kind of thing one side just can't deny, and the other can't absolutely prove. Certainly we can't prove that Khrushchev knew about Abel and his activities. You can prove that an intelligence agent in Russia knew. But I don't think the Soviets will go for a swap. I see no objection to swapping if it could be achieved, but I don't think it's likely to be worked out.

Q - Sir, I wanted to ask if you thought that in the last couple of months we've seen a change in the Communist tactics as far as the youth of native Communist parties is concerned. I mean have the Communists sort of taken the leash off of these parties?

A - The only change I see is the change that has come about as a result of the directives that the Communist Party received after the 21st Party Congress. At that time, particularly the Communist parties in Latin America, received strong instructions to play down their Communist affiliations and to play up nationalism. That is, they weren't to talk about orders from Moscow or about being a part of the great Communist movement or anything of that kind. They were to play the nationalist game. That's what Cuba is doing today. I don't say that Castro necessarily knows about these instructions, although a lot of people around him do. Probably he does. But in any event, what he is doing is exactly in line with the instructions that were given to the Latin American Communist parties in

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February 1959. I don't see very much change in the conduct of the French and the Italian Communist parties. Togliatti goes back and forth to Moscow; he's been there very recently. Communists are, I've been told, to do in Italy just about what the Party told the French Communists to do way back in 1947 or 1948 when the big strikes and riots were on there. I think that the positions of Communist parties in the less developed parts of the world are handled somewhat differently than are those of the Communist parties in sophisticated areas -- like France, Italy and other European countries, Japan, and so forth. But I don't think there's been any great change other than the one I mentioned.

Q - I wonder whether there was any Agency participation in [REDACTED] in the recent problem there in the overthrow of the government?

A - Participation in what? [REDACTED]

Q - What were the Agency's thoughts on the [REDACTED] Whether we had anything to do with the --

A - Well, we did not precipitate the riots or take part in them. We were

[REDACTED]

there would be very serious repercussions from it.

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